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Abstract 
          This paper analyses the factors that influence politicians to enter politics. The 
objective of the project is to examine if the main motivation of politicians to enter 
politics is public interest or private interest. In order to do, we use data from the Spanish 
Congress of Deputies that includes personal and professional information about 
members of Congress of three different legislatures. We construct a multinomial logistic 
model so as to check the interest to enter politics by education and we find some 
evidence that lawyers enter politics because of private interest and the motivation of 
the rest of members with studies different from law, is public interest.  
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1. Introduction and motivation 
 
When analysing how markets work and which are the effects of public regulation on 
industries, the economic regulation is an important topic of research. 
It is believed that certain markets do not work well by their own, markets do not always 
behave efficiently, and the social welfare is not necessarily maximized. The main reason 
for this is the existence of market failures. Therefore, a justification for regulation is to 
correct market failures; economic regulation is essential to make markets works well by 
reducing the inefficiencies generated by market failures and maximize the wellbeing of 
society.  
The Government is seen as a benevolent planner who maximizes the society’s wellbeing 
and intercedes in many ways in order to increase the efficiency and the competitiveness 
of markets but to what extent does the Government benefits some industries and 
disfavours others when it makes an intervention in the market? 
There exist several types of market failures such as,  
• Asymmetrical information: when consumers and producers do not have the 
same information about a product or a service. For instance, when signing an 
insurance contract, the company has less information about the behaviour of the 
consumer than the own consumer.  
• Monopoly: when a producer has a lot of market power and it is the only producer 
of a product in the market, this implies that the price and the quantity produced 
is determined by the monopolist and not by the market. 
• Externalities: situations where prices do not reflect the real cost because it is not 
clear the property of the resource. An example can be an industry that uses the 
water of the river to produce.  
Applying regulation in these cases involves price controls, requirements to give the same 
information to consumers and producers, application of restrictions and this would 
involve big companies to lose market power or reduce benefits. As a result, companies 
would want to influence legislators to maintain their position at the market and not to 
be harmed (O. James; 1999). 
Regulatory capture occurs when individuals or industries influence the legislation to 
obtain their objectives, when special interests of industries affect the state intervention 
and finally, industries end up manipulating the regulation. This may include monetary 
policy, the legislation that involves R&D or setting of prices and taxes (E. Dal Bó; 2006). 
So, when legislators are going to apply many mechanisms to correct market failures and 
prevent the abuse of monopolies, firms influence them to change the legislation in order 
to promote their interests and the regulation ends up being captured because politicians 
give preference to industries’ interests (Cohn, 2019, in the Banking sector, Li et.al, 2019). 
Groups who put pressure on Government and use persuasion to achieve their objectives 
are known as lobbies (M.R. Borges; 2013).  
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Nevertheless, in other cases the Government does not meet the objectives of regulation 
of maximizing the social welfare and it is not because it is influenced by industries or 
groups of individuals. An explanation for this, is that the Government is formed by 
regulators who are influenced by their own interests and therefore, they give preference 
to their interests rather than the society’s interests, this is the case of regulatory failure 
(M.R. Borges; 2013).  
Market failures are not the only problem in the market and are related with regulatory 
capture which happens when regulators are influenced by lobbies and regulatory failure, 
when the regulators take into account their personal interests rather than public 
interests. Hence, applying regulation in order to correct market failures, involves other 
failures such as regulatory failure and regulatory capture.  
 
Stigler’s theory of economic regulation 
George Joseph Stigler is known as the pioneer in public regulation, (Alcántara Sáez, M.; 
2017), he is the author of the paper The theory of economic regulation (G.J. Stigler, 1971) 
in which states that industries and other groups use public resources and public 
regulation as a way to obtain a private benefit from it. Stigler believes that regulation 
serves private interests (G. Tullock; 1967).  
The Government has the power to help some specific groups of industries or individuals 
at the expense of others, this is called the power of coerce. The main question that arises 
from the theory of economic regulation is who is going to benefit from the regulation, 
and what will be the effects of the regulation on the allocation of resources. Stigler 
argues that regulation is mainly designed and constructed for the benefit of some 
industries and this will have a positive effect on those industries but a negative effect 
on other industries. The reason why regulation favours private interests is because 
political institutions usually create incentives for politicians to focus on industries’ 
interests and set aside society’s interests. Regulation can be viewed as a mechanism to 
pursue your objectives.  
Fundamentally, industries use four mechanisms from the Government to obtain 
benefits from the regulation and improve their economic status.  
1. Subsidies: this is the most direct way in which firms can obtain profits from the 
Government. However, they are not the most demanded because firms usually 
must share the quantity they receive with other firms of the sector (G.J. Stigler, 
1971). 
2. Control over competitive entry: this type of regulation is much more preferred 
by firms than subsidies. Entry barriers allows industries of the market to protect 
their products and their status preventing the success of new firms. Also, this 
mechanism implies price controls which is related with the regulation of fixing 
prices. It is usual to set a higher price than the competitive price (G.J. Stigler, 
1971). 
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3. Regulation of substitutes and complements: firms want a coercive power to 
control products that can be substitutes or complements to their products. This 
mechanism would favour monopolists (G.J. Stigler, 1971). 
4. Fixing of prices: implies that the regulator administration is able to fix prices so 
that it can benefit some industries (G.J. Stigler, 1971).  
Evidently, uncertainty is an important factor when firms make decisions and consider 
what will be the effects of regulation. Hence, firms when choosing the mechanisms have 
expectations about what will happen and the benefits that they will obtain with those 
mechanisms. However, powerful businesses and firms typically get in touch with 
political parties, to finance them on condition that regulation goes in their desire way. 
This process reduces the uncertainty of firms about the effects of regulation.  
Taking into account the question formulated by Stigler, politicians’ decision to enter 
politics is influenced by many factors that can be distinguished between public interest 
or political ambition and private interest. 
Public interest to enter politics is represented by the motivation to serve the 
Government. People who enter politics because of public interest do not want 
something in exchange for politics and the only objective is to serve the legislation and 
the Government.  
It can be vocational when someone feels politics as part of his life, altruism because the 
politician really wants to help society, familial legacy when being part of political family 
and you have a huge background in politics. In these cases, the main objectives are 
maximizing the social welfare or proposing several initiatives, promoting social laws, 
protecting public institutions, encourage climate change laws…that is, promoting social 
interests.  
Regarding the private interest, the main motivation to enter politics is to obtain benefits 
from politics for the private life, to improve their economic status, obtain benefits from 
the regulation for the private practice, improve their labour status, and take advantage 
of being the authority to guide politics to their personal benefit. In these cases, they can 
use some mechanisms to their personal benefit.  
Other important factors that politicians consider to stay in politics or not are: the 
probability of being named to a committee, the career opportunities in the private 
sector with respect to the public administration, the level of success as a member of 
Congress, (Keane and Merlo, 2007). Politicians compare their political position to the 
position that they would have in the private sector and evaluate which is the best option.  
The term of duration of politicians in politics can be a good reference to look at and to 
check for example whether there is a tendency to be less time at the Congress or not, 
when politicians look for private interest. We can obtain additional information by 
analysing the reasons why politicians go out from politics and why people enter politics. 
 
In the paper of Keane and Merlo, (2007) they analyse which is the impact of many 
policies on career decisions of members of U.S. Congress taking as reference the paper 
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by Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005). The policies alter wages of politicians. In this 
way, the objective is to check how monetary incentives and political ambition affects 
the career decisions of politicians. They found that “20% reduction in the congressional 
wage disproportionately induces skilled politicians to exit Congress and the reduction of 
wages reduce the duration of congressional careers.” Also, that congressional 
experience significantly increases wages in the private sector. 
 
Besley, (2004) constructs a political agency model to see the effect of modifying the 
remuneration of politicians and if the modification affects the behaviour of politicians 
taking data about wages and the behaviour of members of parliament of the U.S. for 
over 40 years. They reach the conclusion that wages may not be the most relevant factor 
to enter politics but increasing wages increase the quality of politicians.  
 
 
2. The Spanish Electoral System  
 
In Spain the electoral system legislation is regulated by the Spanish Constitution of 1978 
and it is formed by the General Electoral Regime Organic Law of 2011 (LOREG in Spanish) 
which is the updated version of the General Electoral Regime Organic Law of 1985.  
There exist four types of elections: European elections, general elections, elections of 
the autonomous communities and local elections. In this paper we are going to focus on 
general elections which are held for the construction of the General Courts that are 
formed by the Congress of Deputies and the Senate which are the most important 
legislative organizations. 
General elections are held every 4 years although the president of the Government of 
Spain can dissolve the General Courts and call for elections whenever is considered 
appropriate after a year of the last elections; this would be the case of motion of 
censure. Therefore, the term of members of parliament finishes after 4 years when the 
legislature finishes or when the General Courts are dissolved. 
The Spanish Congress is formed by 350 Members in a legislature who represent 50 
provinces and 2 Autonomic Cities, Ceuta and Melilla. The members are elected by 
universal suffrage, free, equal, direct and secret. Members are elected using the 
D’Hondt method at the province level to allocate seats. Each province has a minimum 
representation of two members of Congress but for Ceuta and Melilla that are 
represented by one member of Congress respectively and the rest are allocated 
proportionally to the citizens of each province. For all parties there is a minimum of 3% 
of valid votes (not null votes) in constituency, the province, to have a seat in Congress 
in order to represent a province. 
The D’Hondt method has been criticized because it disadvantages small parties to obtain 
a seat and favours biggest parties. This method gives more possibilities to govern to 
more powerful parties than to small parties, an example for this is that at national level, 
a party with less votes can obtain more seats than a party with more votes.  
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X Legislature  
The X legislature corresponds officially to the period from the 13th of December of 2011 
to the 20th of December of 2015. However, the legislature lasted until the 13th of 
January of 2016. The Conservative political party, Partido Popular (PP) won the elections 
by absolute majority and Mariano Rajoy became the Prime Minister of Spain after Jose 
Luis Rodriguez Zapatero from the Socialist political party, Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español (PSOE) in the IX legislature. At this moment, Spain had been through the 
economic crisis of 2007 and this was an important factor which had an influence on the 
electoral results of the X legislature. Moreover, the Government had to focus on the 
problems caused by the economic crisis. The distribution of members of Congress by 
parties was: 185 members from the conservative party (PP), 110 members from the 
socialist party (PSOE), 11 members from the left party (IU), 5 members from the liberal 
party (UPyD), 21 from nationalists parties (PNV and Convergència I Unió) and 18 
members from the mixed block. 
 
XII Legislature 
The legislature corresponds to the period from the 19th of July of 2016 to the 5th of 
March of 2019 after the dissolution of the General Courts due to anticipated call of 
elections. Before this legislature there was the XI legislature, but this legislature failed 
since it was not possible to invest a President of the Government, so it led to call for new 
elections and the XII legislature started with Mariano Rajoy as a president because the 
Conservative Party won with majority. However, during this legislature the Congress 
called a motion of censure against Mariano Rajoy by Pedro Sánchez from the Socialist 
Party and won the motion of censure which lead him to be the new president of the 
Government. The representation by parties at the Congress in this legislature with Pedro 
Sánchez as president was: 134 members from the conservative party (PP), 84 members 
from the socialist party (PSOE), 67 members from the left party (Podemos), 32 from the 
liberal party (Ciudadanos), 14 members from the nationalists parties (ERC and PNV)  and 
19 members from the mixed block. 
 
XIII Legislature 
The XIII legislature started the 21st of May of 2019. Given that this is the more recent 
legislature, the data about the members of Congress is limited. In this legislature, the 
socialist political party won the elections although no party obtain absolute majority and 
the political party VOX entered at the Congress for the first time. The distribution by 
parties at the Congress is as follows: 123 members from the socialist party (PSOE), 65 
members from the conservative party (PP), 57 from the liberal party (Ciudadanos), 42 
members from the left party (Podemos), 24 members from the far right party (VOX), 20 
members from the nationalists parties (ERC and PNV) and 18 members from the mixed 
block.  
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3. Methods 
 
In this section we present the data used for the empirical analysis which is obtained by 
the Transparency portal of the Spanish Congress of the Deputies1 and then, we make a 
brief descriptive analysis. 
3.1 Data 
The Transparency portal of the Spanish Congress of the Deputies was established in 
1979. Its aim is to give information about the General Courts and its Members to citizens 
and other organisms so that there is transparency. In the webpage it is available a huge 
amount of political information of the Congress and the Congress’ Members such as the 
listing of all members from all legislatures, the salary obtained by each public service 
position, publications, political news, results of different elections, information about 
near events…  
The data is obtained from the Members and Former Members: consolidated list and The 
Records of Members’ Interests at the Spanish Congress which is available at The 
Transparency portal of the Spanish Congress of the Deputies.  The enormous amount of 
information at the webpage allows us to make a study about the Congress Members and 
to construct different models to test various hypothesis. 
We use data of three legislatures, the X legislature corresponding to the period 2011-
2016, the XII legislature that corresponds to the period 2016-2019 and the XIII 
legislature, the current legislature. We do not use the data of the XI legislature because 
as it has been mentioned, in this legislature political parties were not able to form 
majority to form a Government and the legislature failed.  
We have collected information about the 350 Congress’ members in the X legislature, 
about the 393 Congress’ members in the XII legislature and some information about the 
349 Congress’ members in the XIII legislature. Since in the XII legislature there were two 
different Governments, we have collected the total members of the Congress in that 
legislature, that is, the members that dropped out and the new members.  
In this dataset there is information about each member of the Congress of the X and XII 
legislature, there is personal information as their age, gender, marital status, number of 
kids and professional information like the level of education, labour status, their political 
party, the province that they represent, the salary… 
In the case of the more recent legislature, the XIII legislature, the dataset contains 
information about the political party, the age, the province that they represent and if 
they have been in other legislatures or not. However, there is no information about the 
education, profession, salary…of the members of Congress for the moment. Hence, we 
use data of the XIII legislature only for the descriptive analysis.  
                                                             
1 Information about the Members of the Spanish Congress available at www.congreso.es 
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Next, we present descriptive statistics of the variables. Since we are going to estimate 
models to find out relationships between the variables, we distinguish dependent 
variables from explanatory variables.  
Dependent variables:  
• 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖: it is a categorical variable with nominal outcomes. The categories 
represent the field of education of the members of Congress and cannot be 
ordered. The categories are coded as follows: 
o 1. Law: bachelor’s degree in law. 
o 2. Business: bachelor’s degree in business administration or economics. 
o 3. Arts: bachelor’s degree in philosophy, philology, history, geography, 
journalism, political studies, teaching and sociology.  
o 4. Science: bachelor’s degree in engineering, physics, chemistry, 
medicine, psychology, biology, architecture and informatics. 
o 5. Not university studies: if the person has not university studies.  
• 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖: takes value 1 if the member of Congress is a professional politician 
and 0 otherwise. We consider a professional politician is the one who only works 
in politics during the legislature and has been in politics for 3 years or more. 
Explanatory variables: 
• 𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖: it takes value 1 if the member of Congress has a bachelor’s degree in 
Law and 0 otherwise. 
• 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖: it takes value 1 if the member of Congress has a bachelor’s degree 
in Economics and 0 otherwise. 
• 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖: it takes value 1 if the member of Congress has a bachelor’s degree 
different from Law and Economics such as teacher, philology, medicine, 
engineering… 
• 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖: is a continuous variable. Age of each member of the Congress in years. 
• 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖: takes value 1 if the member of Congress is female and 0 otherwise. 
• 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖: takes value 1 if the member of Congress is married and 0 otherwise. 
• 𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖: the number of kids of each member of Congress. 
• 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖: monthly salary of each member of Congress, it depends on the number 
of commissions and the position of the deputy, if it is president, vice-president, 
prolocutor or secretary of commissions or of the Congress, that is, the public 
service position.  
• 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖: number of total initiatives of each member of Congress during the 
legislature examined.  
• 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖: takes value 1 if the member of Congress owns a firm or is a high executive 
and 0 otherwise. 
• 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖: takes value 1 if the member of Congress is elected by the 
conservative political party and 0 otherwise. 
• 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖: takes value 1 if the member of Congress is elected by the socialist 
political party and 0 otherwise. 
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• 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖: number of members of Congress in the province 
represented by the member. 
• 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑖: takes value 1 if the member has been in previous legislatures and 0 
otherwise.  
• 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖: takes value 1 if the member of Congress worked for the Public 
Sector before being a member of Congress and 0 otherwise. 
• 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖: takes value 1 if a member from the X legislature has left the Congress 
and continues working in politics and 0 otherwise.  
 
3.2 Descriptive analysis   
In this section we make a descriptive analysis of the variables to have an idea of the 
composition and the values that can take each of them. Moreover, this is useful to the 
empirical analysis and the interpretation of the results. Table 1 reports the descriptive 
statistics for the X legislature and the XII legislature. There are 350 observations in the X 
legislature and 393 observations in the XII legislature although we do not have all 
observations for all variables.  
Table  1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Min. Max N: number of 
observations 
 X XII X XII X XII 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 49.49 53.54 26      74 25    77 349 393 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 0.39 0.41 0        1 0       1 350 393 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑖 - 0.38 0         1 0       1 0 393 
𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 1.73 1.96 0         7 0       1 296 171 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 0.73 0.55 0         1 0       1 350 393 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 7005.04 6743.34 4637.7    
37280.2 
3889.97 
38383.9 
350 393 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 56.36 215.33 0        1337 0       1 350 393 
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖  0.17 0.10 0        1 0       1 350 393 
𝑃𝑃𝑖 0.57 0.39 0        1 0       1 350 393 
𝑃𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑖 0.30 0.24 0        1 0       1 350 393 
𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑖 0.41 0.37 0        1 0       1 350 393 
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖 0.09 0.13 0        1 0       1 350 393 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖 0.45 0.48 0        1 0       1 320 368 
 
 
In the following illustrations we represent the percentages of economists, lawyers, 
professional politicians, CEO, people with university studies different from economics 
and law and the members of the conservative and socialist parties, respectively, in each 
legislature X and XII.  
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In the XII legislature the number of females, economists, the number of kids, the age 
and members with studies different from law and economics increased. So, in this 
legislature there were more females and economists, and the members of Congress 
were older and had more kids on average with respect to the X legislature. Members 
with law studies decreased whereas the number of economists and people with studies 
different from law and economics increased.  
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An 8.6% of the members of Congress in the X legislature and a 5.4% of the members of 
Congress in the XII legislature had no university studies.  
In the XII legislature there were fewer professional politicians, which means that less 
people worked only in politics. Specially, the percentage of professional politicians was 
reduced by 17% approximately. Also, the number of CEOs, high executives, was reduced 
in the XII legislature. 
Note the difference in means of the number of proposals between both legislatures. In 
order to make a comparison between the proposals of each legislature, we divide the 
number of proposals by the number of months of each legislature. In the X legislature 
the deputies made on average 1.174 proposals monthly and in the XII legislature 8.26. 
However, the salary in the XII legislature was lower than in the X legislature, in the X 
legislature was about 7005.04€ and in the XII legislature was approximately 6743.34€ 
on average.  
The salary is connected with the number of commissions and the position at the 
Congress; it is not related with the number of proposals. Moreover, there are two types 
of commissions, permanent commissions and not permanent commissions. Not 
permanent commissions are created for something specific and finishes when the work 
is completed. Nevertheless, the salary is the same for all commissions.  
The number of members of Congress elected by Socialist and Conservative Parties was 
reduced in the XII legislature, the main reason for this is the entrance of new parties in 
Congress such as Podemos (left party), Ciudadanos (liberal centre party) or ERC, PNV 
(nationalist parties), we classify these parties as other political parties. Before the XI 
legislature most members of Congress were from the two main parties, Conservative or 
Socialist, because of the two-party predominance or bipartisanship.  
 
Table 2 shows the percentage of deputies that have repeated legislature by political 
parties and legislature. 
Table  2: Members of Congress by parties and legislatures 
 Conservative party Socialist party Other political parties 
(left, liberal, nationalist) 
Legislature XII XIII XII XIII XII XIII 
Number of deputies  156 66 98 124 139 160 
Number of deputies who 
have repeated 
65 39 33 39 16 55 
Percentage of deputies 
who have repeated  
41.6% 59% 33.6% 31% 11.5% 34% 
 
In the XII legislature the majority of members of Congress who have repeated legislature 
are from the socialist and conservative parties. A 41.6% of members of Congress from 
the conservative party were in other legislatures and a 33.6% from the socialist party, 
whereas only 11.5% members of Congress from other political parties have repeated. 
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In the XIII legislature the composition of the Congress by parties changes significantly. 
The number of deputies from the socialist party and other political parties increased 
relevantly, whereas the number of members of Congress from the conservative party 
was reduced. This change is caused partly by the entrance of new parties at the 
Congress.  
In the XIII legislature a 34% of members of Congress from other political parties have 
repeated legislature. More than a half of members of Congress from the conservative 
party were in another legislature and a 31% from the socialist party repeated legislature.  
 
On the other hand, we have collected data about the job of people who have left the 
Congress (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖). Particularly, we have data about 207 members of Congress from 
the X legislature who have left the Congress since there is no information available for 
the rest of people about their current job. In the following illustration we can see the 
proportion of people who continue working in politics and the proportion of people who 
is not working in politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We can observe that a 49.76% are not working in political position and a 50.24% 
continue in politics.  
The proportion is very symmetric, approximately, half of the people who left the 
Congress are working in politics and the other half are not. Most people who left the 
Congress and continues working in political position are senators, Government advisers 
and councillors. Before being members of Congress the majority of them were mayors, 
Government advisers, councillors, university professors and Government assessors. So, 
most of them were working for the Public Sector before being a congressman. 
 
 
Illustration 1: Politics: Proportion of people who have left the 
Congress working in politics 
50.24% 
207 obs. 
Working in 
politics 
Not 
working in 
politics 
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Table 3 displays all provinces and the percentage of lawyers and economists over the 
total number of deputies in each province at Congress in each legislature. Highlighted 
provinces are those where there are more deputies. In the X legislature Madrid, 
Barcelona, Valencia and the Canary Islands had 35, 31, 16 and 15 members of Congress 
respectively and in the XII legislature 43, 36, 19 and 17 deputies. Is there any relationship 
between the province and the number of lawyers? Are there more lawyers in provinces 
with more deputies? 
 
Table  3: Percentage of lawyers and economists by province and legislature 
 X Legislature XII Legislature 
Province % Lawyers % Economists % Lawyers % Economists 
Alava 75.0% 0.0% 40.0% 40.0% 
Albacete 25.0% 25.0% 40.0% 20.0% 
Alicante 33.3% 8.3% 38.5% 30.8% 
Almería 33.3% 0.0% 42.9% 0.0% 
Asturias 25.0% 0.0% 22.2% 22.2% 
Avila 100.0% 0.0% 66.7% 66.7% 
Badajoz 33.3% 0.0% 37.5% 12.5% 
Barcelona 51.6% 3.2% 38.9% 5.6% 
Bizkaia 62.5% 12.5% 40.0% 20.0% 
Burgos 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 
Caceres 25.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
Cadiz 22.2% 0.0% 54.5% 0.0% 
Cantabria 20.0% 20.0% 28.6% 28.6% 
Castellón 40.0% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 
Ceuta 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Ciudad Real 40.0% 0.0% 40.0% 0.0% 
Cordoba 66.7% 16.7% 62.5% 0.0% 
Coruña 0.0% 25.0% 37.5% 25.0% 
Cuenca 66.7% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 
Gipuzkoa 50.0% 16.7% 16.7% 0.0% 
Girona 50.0% 0.0% 14.3% 0.0% 
Granada 42.9% 0.0% 42.9% 0.0% 
Guadalajara 66.7% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 
Huelva 80.0% 0.0% 40.0% 20.0% 
Huesca 66.7% 0.0% 0.0% 33.3% 
Islas Baleares 37.5% 0.0% 37.5% 12.5% 
Islas Canarias 20.0% 13.3% 17.6% 11.8% 
Jaen 50.0% 16.7% 42.9% 0.0% 
La Rioja 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 
Leon 100.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
Lleida 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 
Lugo 50.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
Madrid 22.9% 17.1% 27.9% 23.3% 
Malaga 40.0% 20.0% 18.2% 18.2% 
Melilla 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 
Murcia 30.0% 20.0% 30.8% 15.4% 
Navarra 40.0% 20.0% 40.0% 0.0% 
Ourense 75.0% 0.0% 75.0% 0.0% 
Palencia 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 
Pontevedra 0.0% 14.3% 12.5% 25.0% 
Salamanca 75.0% 0.0% 75.0% 0.0% 
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Segovia 66.7% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 
Sevilla 25.0% 16.7% 58.3% 8.3% 
Soria 0.0% 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 
Tarragona 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 
Teruel 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Toledo 50.0% 0.0% 42.9% 0.0% 
Valencia 43.8% 6.3% 36.8% 5.3% 
Valladolid 80.0% 20.0% 33.3% 0.0% 
Zamora 66.7% 0.0% 66.7% 0.0% 
 
The percentage of lawyers was reduced in the XII legislature in provinces with more 
representation at the Congress, that is, the highlighted provinces, but for Madrid where 
the percentage of lawyers and economists increased from 22.9% to 17.1% and from 
17.1% to 23.3% respectively.  
In the case of Barcelona only the percentage of economists increased approximately by 
2.4%.  
 
 
In order to check if there exist any correlation between the number of deputies in the 
province and the percentage of lawyers the province, we estimate Model 1 by OLS 
(Ordinary Least Squares) for both legislatures. Then, we compute the significance tests 
to see if the number of deputies in the province is relevant to determine the number 
percentage of lawyers in that province.  
 
%𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 (1) 
 
We have tested before if there is any problem of heteroskedasticity in the models by 
computing the Breusch Pagan Test, in that case we would estimate the models by WLS 
(Weighted Least Squares),  
 
     H0: constant variance (homoskedasticity)  
     HA: heteroskedasticity   
 
 
In both cases we fail to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity since p=0.14>0.05 
in the X legislature and p=0.11>0.05 in the XII legislature. Consequently, there is no 
problem of heteroskedasticity and the OLS estimation is consistent in both cases. 
 
 
There are 52 observations that are the provinces and the autonomic cities of Spain. 
 
The null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are,  
 
𝐻0: 𝛽 = 0 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 is irrelevant and there is no correlation between the number of 
deputies in the province and the percentage of lawyers.  
𝐻𝐴: 𝛽 ≠ 0 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 is relevant and there is a correlation between the number of 
deputies in the province and the percentage of lawyers. 
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Table 4 reports the estimation results of model 1. 
Table  4: Estimation results of model (1) 
%𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖 X Legislature XII Legislature 
Constant 0.529 
(0.05) 
0.44 
(0.05) 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 -0.009 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
Notes: 51 observations. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 
5% level and *** denotes significance at 1% level. Standard errors in brackets. 
In both cases, we do not reject the null hypothesis at 5% level of significance. Therefore, 
the coefficient of  𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖 is not significant and there is no correlation between the 
number of deputies in the province and the percentage of lawyers in that province.  
We conclude that the number of lawyers in the province and the number of deputies in 
the province are independent. 
 
 
4. Testing procedure 
 
In this section we explain the methodology used to test the hypothesis that people enter 
politics because of private interest. Since we want to analyse if some studies are 
adequate for politics or if the person enter politics only because of private interest, we 
estimate a multinomial logistic model using a nominal variable educ𝑖 with nominal 
outcomes as dependent variable. 
The initial model that we want to estimate is, 
 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 +
                +  𝛽6𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖      (2) 
 
Nevertheless, we have tested if the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 is endogenous because being 
politician can be related with other variables related with the decision of being a 
professional politician or not such as, working at the public sector, the test is explained 
in the Appendix. We found that p=0.046<0.05 so we reject the null hypothesis that 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 is exogenous in favour to the alternative hypothesis that the variable 
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 is endogenous. Then, the errors and the explanatory variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 
are correlated.  
Thus, it is not consistent to include the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 in the model as an 
explanatory variable and we estimate the following logistic model in order to see if 
having worked in the public sector is significant to determine the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖. 
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𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖     (3) 
 
The estimation results of the logit model are reported in Table 5. 
 
Table  5: Estimation results of the equation (3) 
Politician𝑖 Coefficient Marginal effect, dx/dy 
Constant -0.088 
(0.172) 
 
PublicSector𝑖  0.829*** 
(0.192) 
0.186*** 
(0.041) 
Notes: 731 observations. * denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 
5% level and *** denotes significance at 1% level. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
The variable 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 is relevant at 0.1% level of significance, therefore having 
worked for the public sector before being member of Congress is significant to 
determine if the person is a professional politician or not. If the person has worked for 
the public sector the probability of being a professional politician increases, particularly, 
in 0.18.  
Once we now the variable 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 is relevant to explain the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖, 
it is possible to take it as an instrument of the variable 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 because most people 
who have worked in the public sector are professional politicians. Therefore, we 
estimate two models, model (4) excluding the variable 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 and model (5) 
with the variable 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 so as to compare the results. In addition, we have 
checked that there is no correlation between 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 and errors so as not to be 
a problem of specification.  
 
The first model is,  
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
                  + 𝛽7𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                  (4) 
            
The second model is,  
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 +
                  + 𝛽7𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 + 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖                                                                                                     (5) 
 
We estimate the multinomial logistic model by Maximum Likelihood method (ML) and 
then, we make the following test for both models. 
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In order to test what is the motivation to enter politics we consider the following null 
and alternative hypothesis,  
𝐻0: 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 = 0 the person enter politics because of private interest  
𝐻𝐴: 𝛽3 ≠  𝑎𝑛𝑑/𝑜𝑟 𝛽4 ≠ 0  the person does not enter politics because of private interest 
(public interest) 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖: the number of proposals represents the interest in politics of each member 
of Congress. If the person is looking for public interest rather than for private interest, 
we should obtain a positive and relevant coefficient is since the member would 
participate in more initiatives.  
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖: the salary is related with the number of commissions, the more commissions 
the higher salary, therefore, if the person enter politics because of public interest, the 
sign of the coefficient should be positive and significant. The salary is not related with 
the number of initiatives and the salary is the same for all commissions. 
If the person enter politics because of private interest, we should obtain that the 
number of proposals and the salary are irrelevant because members in this case are not 
really interested in politics so, they are not going to take part in commissions and 
proposals.  
On the other hand, we consider control variables, the age, the gender and the number 
of kids but these variables do not determine whether the person enter politics because 
of private interest or not. 
Moreover, we cannot interpret the estimated coefficients, only their sign so, we 
compute the marginal changes of the variables for each category of the variable educ𝑖 
to see what the change in the probabilities is when there is a change in the variable. In 
the case of binary variables, the change is discrete from 0 to 1. 
 
5. Results 
 
The following table shows the estimation results from the multinomial logistic models. 
The base outcome is outcome 1 (law studies); consequently, all coefficients are 
interpreted with respect to a person who has a bachelor’s degree in law. We have 465 
observations in the model excluding the variable 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖, model 4 and 459 
observations in the model including 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖, model 5. The reason for not having 
743 observations of the X and the XII legislatures, that is, all observations for each 
legislature, is that we do not have data for all observations of each explanatory variable. 
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Table  6. Estimation results of the models (4) and (5) 
 Coefficient 
 2 3 4 5 
 Model 
 (4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
 (4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
 (4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
 (4) 
Model 
 (5) 
Constant -0.583 
(0.758) 
-0.45 
(0.71) 
0.368 
(0.761) 
-0.15 
(0.83) 
-1.63*** 
(0.456) 
-1.13 
(0.51) 
-1.75 
(0.572) 
-1.64** 
(0.64) 
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 0.708* 
(0.382) 
0.63* 
(0.39) 
-0.519 
(0.412) 
-0.52 
(0.41) 
-0.066 
(0.405) 
-0.19 
(0.41) 
-0.065 
(0.44) 
-0.075 
(0.44) 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖  0.002** 
(0.0007) 
0.002** 
(0.0007) 
0.002** 
(0.0007) 
0.002** 
(0.00) 
0.001** 
(0.0007) 
0.002** 
(0.00) 
0.00077 
(0.0009) 
0.0008 
(0.0008) 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 -0.152 * 
(0.08) 
-0.15* 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.048) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.005) 
0.46 
(0.048) 
-0.003 
(0.00007) 
0.035 
(0.00) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 -0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.033** 
(0.0149) 
-0.034* 
(0.015) 
-0.00048 
(0.0019) 
-0.0008 
(0.001) 
-0.0004 
(0.002) 
-0.00058 
(0.002) 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 0.133 
(0.337) 
0.11 
(0.33) 
-0.046 
(0.278) 
-0.054 
(0.27) 
0.168 
(0.295) 
0.189 
(0.29) 
0.589 
(0.323) 
0.58* 
(0.32) 
𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖  -0.045 
(0.134) 
-0.043 
(0.14) 
0.073 
(0.121) 
0.104 
(0.12) 
0.057 
(0.115) 
0.064 
(0.12) 
-0.056 
(0.132) 
-0.044 
(0.13) 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖  -0.22 
(0.41) 
 0.62 
(0.42) 
 -0.62* 
(0.34) 
 -0.162 
(0.42) 
Notes: 465 observations in model 4 and 459 observations in model 5. * denotes 
significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at 1% level. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
For all categories but for the category of not university studies the more proposals the 
higher probability of having studies in business, arts and science with respect to law 
studies. Therefore, if the person has a bachelor’s degree different from law, the 
probability of taking part in proposals increases. Note that the variable 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 is 
relevant at 5% level of significance in both models. 
The salary and 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 are relevant at 10% level of significance only for people with 
business studies. The higher salary the lower probability to have business studies and if 
the person is a CEO the higher probability that the person has business studies.  
For the rest of the categories, the salary is not relevant, so, the salary is not significant 
to determine the type of education at the Congress. There is no relationship between 
the studies and the salary.  
Having worked for the Public Sector is relevant at 10% level of significance for science 
category (outcome 4). If the person has worked for the Public Sector reduces the 
probability of having science studies, that is to say, someone who has worked for the 
Public Sector is not probably that he has science studies. 
These results imply a partial evidence of public interest for all members of Congress with 
university studies different from law because for all cases we obtain that  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 is relevant at 5% level of significance so, the more proposals the higher 
probability of having a bachelor’s degree different from law and the salary is not 
significant in most cases. People who take part in more initiatives which means that they 
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are really interested in politics, are more probably to have business studies, arts studies 
or science studies. 
The estimation results for not university studies category are not very clear, since we do 
not obtain significant results.  
 
We also compute marginal changes for each outcome of the variable educ𝑖 in order to 
see what the change in the probability of each category is when there is a change in the 
explanatory variables. For binary variables the change is a discrete change from 0 to 1, 
this is the case of 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖, 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 and 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖.  
In Table 7 are represented the marginal changes for each outcome of the variable educ𝑖, 
outcome 1 (law studies), outcome 2 (business studies), outcome 3 (arts studies) and 
outcome 4 (science studies). We do not compute the marginal effects for outcome 5, 
the category of not university studies, since we do not obtain significant results in the 
multinomial logit estimation.  
 
Table  7. Marginal effects of models (4) and (5) 
 Marginal effects, dx/dy 
 1 2 3 4 
 Model 
(4) 
Model  
(5) 
Model 
(4) 
Model  
(5) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
 (5) 
𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 
0.0051 0.004 
0.103* 
 
0.091* 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.02 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖  
-0.0003** -0.0004** 
0.00008** 
 
0.00008** 
 
0.0001** 
 
0.0001** 
 
0.0001** 
 
0.00015** 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 
-0.0006 -0.0005 
-0.017* 
 
-0.016* 
 
0.0061 
 
0.0058 
 
0.008 
 
0.007 
 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 
0.003* 0.0027* 
-0.0004 
 
-0.0004 
 
-0.004** 
 
-0.005* 
 
0.0008 
 
0.0008 
 
𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 
-0.046 -0.046 
0.003 
 
0.00075 
 
-0.025 
 
-0.026 
 
0.01 
 
0.014 
 
𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖  
-0.0048 -0.0078 
-0.0061 
 
-0.007 
 
0.01 
 
0.014 
 
0.007 
 
0.007 
 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖  
0.035 
 -0.016 
 
 0.093 
 
 -0.11* 
 
Notes: 465 observations in model 4 and 459 observations in model 5. * denotes 
significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and *** denotes 
significance at 1% level. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
We can observe that the marginal change of the number of proposals is very similar in 
all cases and in both models but for the category of law studies (outcome 1), because of 
the inverse relationship between the number of proposals and the category law studies.  
Making 1 proposal more reduces the probability of being lawyer in 0.0003 in model 4, 
whereas increases the probability for the rest of the categories.  
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For science studies, an increase of 1 proposal more increases the probability of a 
member of Congress of having a bachelor’s degree in science in 0.0001 in model 4 and 
having worked for the Public Sector before decreases the probability in 0.11.  
In the case of lawyers there is a partial evidence of private interests, because they tend 
to make less proposals. 
As we have mentioned, we find that in all categories of university studies but for law 
studies there is a partial evidence of public interest since the more proposals the more 
probability to have a bachelor’s degree in business, arts or science. Members with 
business, arts and science studies are interested in politics because they tend to make 
more proposals. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The aim of this paper was to analyse the motivation of people to enter politics. We have 
distinguished between public interest, which represents the real interest in politics and 
in maximising social welfare and private interest, which represents the use of politics as 
a way to obtain private benefits. This was previously discussed by many authors since 
regulation is an important element of politics and it is very related with regulatory failure 
and regulatory capture. Several researches about this topic suggested that economic 
benefits are not the most important factors of the motivation of people to enter politics. 
In order to check what is the motivation to enter politics we have used a database about 
Spanish Congressmen of three different legislatures, X legislature, XII legislature and XIII 
legislature, which contains personal information about members of Congress and 
information about their professional career, to estimate two multinomial logistic models 
taking as a dependent variable 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖, which has five categories of education. Like this, 
we have been able to observe if the type of education has an influence on the interest 
of people to enter politics, if some degrees are more desirable for politics than others 
or if there is a private interest behind it. Moreover, we have made a comparison 
between legislatures and we have observed that in the most recent legislatures the 
distribution of the Congress by parties has changed relevantly. 
Along the estimating procedure we have dealt with endogeneity of the variable 
Politician𝑖, so we had to collect data about the decision of being a professional politician 
such as, if the person had been working in the Public Sector before being a congressman 
or not. We found that having worked for the Public Sector before was highly correlated 
with being a professional politician. Therefore, we estimated two models, a model 
excluding the variable 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 and another model including it to compare the 
results. We also, computed the marginal changes of the probabilities to see what the 
change in the probabilities is when there is a change in the variable. 
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The estimation results indicated that the education is relevant to see what the 
motivation of people is to enter politics. Lawyers are partially motivated by the private 
interest since we have obtained that lawyers are less likely to make proposals whereas 
the rest of the education categories demonstrated a partial public interest in politics 
because they are more likely to make more proposals and take part in more initiatives. 
However, the salary is not relevant, so the education and the salary are not correlated.  
Making one proposal more decreases the probability of being a lawyer at the Congress 
in 0.0003 and increases the probability of having a bachelor’s degree in business in 
0.00008, and arts and science in 0.0001.  
In conclusion, in this paper we have detected significant differences between 
legislatures, and we have made an analysis about Spanish politicians’ motivation. We 
have found evidence of the different influence of education on the interest to enter 
politics, depending on the type of education the interest in politics can vary. Another 
interesting study related with this paper would be to examine the factors that affect the 
decision of politicians to stay in politics.  
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8. Appendix  
 
Testing for endogeneity 
In this section it is explained the testing procedure of endogeneity of the 
variable Politician𝑖. 
If Politician𝑖 is endogenous, 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (Politician𝑖, 𝑢𝑖) ≠ 0. 
The initial model is Model 2, 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖
+  𝛽6𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 
We take the reduced form for Politician𝑖, and estimate the reduced model taking all 
exogenous variables. 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 is an additional variable which does not appear in 
the initial model. 
 
Politician𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛼2𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
All explanatory variables of the reduced model are uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖. Then, now 
Politician𝑖 is uncorrelated with 𝑢𝑖 if and only if 𝑢𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖  are uncorrelated. So, what we 
want to test is if 𝑢𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖  are uncorrelated. 
We introduce 𝜀?̂? in the initial model, Model 2 and we estimate it. Finally, we check if the 
variable Politician𝑖 is endogenous or not by the test of endogeneity.  
 
𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖   
+   𝛽6𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑘𝑖𝑑𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽8𝜀?̂? + 𝜖𝑖  
 
The hypotheses are, 
H0: 𝐸(𝜀𝑖, 𝑢𝑖) = 0 and/or 𝛽8̂ = 0  (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 is exogenous) 
HA: 𝐸(𝜀𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖) ≠ 0 and/or 𝛽8̂ ≠ 0 (𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 is endogenous) 
 
We reject the null hypothesis that 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 is exogenous in favour to the alternative 
hypothesis 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 is endogenous since the estimated coefficient 𝛽8̂ ≠ 0 and the p-
value of the test is 0.46<0.05. Hence, the variable is endogenous.  
 
